At this moment of consequential challenges that even the most powerful nations cannot resolve on their own, there is greater need than ever before for leadership to help manage growing international economic linkages. And at a time when the rising powers are fl exing their economic muscle but not yet prepare to take on the burdens of global leadership, the need for the United States to provide leadership continues undiminished.
But while the need for U.S. leadership in the global economy is clear, the capacity is less so. How well prepared are we to lead-especially when it will require doing so through cooperation and persuasion and by example? How prepared are our political leaders-especially when many Americans believe they are victims rather than benefi ciaries of global competition?
The remainder of this paper will explore the changing context for U.S. international economic leadership, review our economic goals, and discuss the adequacy of the instruments available for pursuing those goals. While the rapid growth of the middle class in countries such as China and India is helping to fuel the global economy, it is also contributing to a broad commodity price boom that is further redistributing wealth globally and contributing to global infl ationary pressures.
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
Growing demands for grains both for feedstocks and biofuels have led to an astonishing reversal of decades of progress on food security with attendant risks to political stability.
Diminishing Power of Policy:
The size, complexity, and integration of capital markets are complicating economic policy management. The proliferation of new fi nancial instruments and institutions is proceeding faster than the regulatory apparatus can adapt, impeding our ability to preserve fi nancial stability. The size of private fi nancial holdings and fl ows dwarfs the resources that the U.S. government and its offi cial partners (including the international fi nancial institutions) can deploy to stabilize exchange rates or other key asset prices. Moreover, fi nancial markets blanketing the globe are responding instantaneously and continuously to news and public policy pronouncements, leaving little time for planning and execution and razor thin margins for error, and leading to the conundrum that while U.S. and other offi cials have unprecedented power to move the markets (witness the swings that follow minor recalibrations of message by Fed Chairman Bernanke), they are practically powerless to sustain those movements unless their statements refl ect meaningful policy action (e.g. the Fed's ability to alter short-term interest rates). Offi cial cheerleading with no policy behind it is more likely to undermine credibility than achieve any meaningful change.
The Infl ation-Recession Conundrum:
The global macro-economy will continue to be buffeted by infl ationary and contractionary forces in the coming years, leading many countries to be self-protective and less receptive to collective initiatives. With no quick fi x in sight, the housing and banking sector crises that are slowing growth in the United States and Europe are likely to sap economic vitality for years. The sharp and broad commodity price increase is helping commodity exporters, but hurting importers while posing a dilemma for monetary authorities. Some countries are reluctant to react forcefully to rising infl ation for fear that slowdown is around the corner, while others are reluctant to react to slowdown for fear that infl ation will take hold. In short, the days when U.S. offi cial entrée and clout came from the prospects of some advice and an IMF loan are mainly gone. Most emerging market countries have been managing their domestic economic policies far better than ever before.
Related, we are likely to see more private sector distress, which will be less amenable to offi cial action.
The dismantling of interventionist subsidy schemes, the privatization of banks and non-fi nancial corporations, and the adoption of more fl exible exchange rate regimes (not to mention the accumulation of record foreign exchange reserves) all help take public fi nances off the front lines of economic confl ict.
In this setting, adverse economic and political events that push around market prices and affect the cost and availability of capital will in the fi rst instance hit the private sector. We are beginning to see the impact of food and energy price increases and the impact of stock, bond, and housing price declines on households and companies in emerging market economies.
Depending on governments' reactions, we will either see a period where private sector distress sets the context for the global macro-economy, or where renewed subsidization by governments eventually erodes public sector fi nances. The U.S. should be prepared to cope with both situations. In the U.S., the evangelical community joined popular culture celebrities and NGOs to advocate successfully fi rst for debt relief and subsequently for massive funding for HIV/AIDS and more modest gain in areas such as malaria and primary education. In parallel, recognition has grown in U.S. military and foreign policy circles that as we prepare for a world where seemingly distant threats can metastasize into immediate emergencies, the fi ght against global poverty is becoming a fi ght of necessity-not only because personal morality demands it, but because national security does as well. These two converging strands have helped provided the biggest boost to foreign assistance in decades along with a proliferation of uncoordinated institutional arrangements to administer it. 
U.S. LEADERSHIP: SEVEN OBJECTIVES
T o set the stage for a discussion of the instruments available for the exercise of U.S. international economic leadership, it is helpful fi rst to review our goals. At a basic level, our key international economic goals remain:
To promote prosperity for all Americans by making the most of the positive-sum-game opportunities afforded by the global economy, and To stop globalization from transforming into a negative sum game by taking action to prevent economic, fi nancial, climate and security instability from undermining the global economy.
Of course as one elaborates those goals into specifi c actionable objectives, greater complexity and room for signifi cant policy disagreement emerges, particularly between those objectives that advance American interests directly and those that advance them indirectly through greater stability and prosperity abroad.
Rather than address all of the many extant issues in international economics, here is an annotated list of objectives to support our goals:
Promote Resilient, Adaptable Systems to Facilitate
Global Flows: Without minimizing the diffi culty, progress will require ensuring that the gains from the growth of global markets are believed to be shared widely by a much broader group of Americans while also balancing the many competing interests of all trade partners, and incorporating environmental and labor issues into agreements. To strengthen legitimacy, the rules must not only be signed but also enforced. And the rules governing global commerce will need to keep up with the dynamism of the market itself. To make signifi cant progress, we will have to take on the complex issues around agriculture and commodity subsidization worldwide. Increasing attention
• •
will also need to be devoted not only to the quantity but also the quality of trade world wide to ensure the integrity of global supply chains and guard against risks to health, safety, and the environment. In doing so, we will certainly empower SWFs and their governments, not to mention provide an incentive for countries to accumulate national wealth in state institutions. In some cases, that will mean empowering governments with which we have confl icts, and more generally that empowerment will contradict our basic value of private savings and ownership by individuals.
Take Action to Address Global Sustainability:
Along with the medium-term goals of promoting growth and stability, we also need to work on the lon-ger-term challenge of forging a global consensus on how we will share an increasingly crowded planet. The big issues to tackle include the strains of global population growth, environmental damage, the alleviation of extreme poverty, and the climate crisis. The latter will require mustering the political will to take meaningful action on climate at the national level while also working to forge international agreement so that markets and regulatory policy provide a consistent set of incentives to move away from carbon intensive methods of production and transport. It will require a delicate balance of suasion and pressure to induce the fastest growing emitters to take action in the face of concerns about growth. It will require large transfers of assistance and fi nancing to help the most vulnerable nations adapt. And it will inevitably risk trade 
THE INSTRUMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LEADERSHIP: SEVEN REFORMS F
inally, it is useful to review how well-equipped the U.S. government is from an institutional standpoint to achieve its goals. Our internal governmental structures and the international institutions at our disposal were created in different times for different purposes and, while they have evolved somewhat as globalization proceeds, there are defi ciencies we must address. It is instructive to ask if we were starting from scratch whether we would create the existing institutions and processes to address today's key challenges. The answer in a few cases below is a clear no suggesting the need for reform. Generalizing that same principle to the international realm immediately highlights the growing awkwardness of the G8. The G8 countries represent about three fi fths of global GDP (and falling). Europe has fi ve chairs, which is an imbalance of power (imagine if the U.S. president were joined at these meetings by the Governor of California, whose economy outranks a few current members). So, even when the G8 acts (which is rare), the rest of the world resents what they view as a presumption of power. The G20 includes a broader and more relevant representation of the global economy and has the potential to make a major contribution, but it seems too unwieldy to be an executive body or to act in times of crisis. An intermediate size, such as a G13, might strike a better balance between legitimacy and representation on the one hand and effectiveness on the other. Much ink has been spilled for many years on how to form another group. Without adding appreciably to the spilled ink, it will be useful to develop a new forum that will help us promote understanding, action, and responsible global citizenship. As for particular economic issues, we will soon need a group with global legitimacy to take up the very pressing issue of the inadequacy of exchange rate policies.
Raising Our Game on Technical Expertise and
Resources: Within Departments, resources and staffing are not up to the task of international leadership.
The complexity of global banking and capital markets stretches the capabilities of civil and foreign services trained in another era. We are not as constrained as many of our G7 partners, because many political apEven when the G8 acts, the rest of the world resents what they view as a presumption of power. The G20 includes a broader and more relevant representation of the global economy, but it seems too unwieldy to be an executive body or to act in times of crisis. Many of these reforms can be undertaken using existing executive authorities. 
Improving the Quality of Market Intelligence
Securely: Finally, we will need to rethink the quality and security of economic policy information. As the need for international policy discussion and cooperation grows, so does the prospect for leaks of information to market participants. Individuals who obtain insights into government policy intentions through their conversations with government offi cials will be able to reap huge and near-instantaneous gains. The issues include the security of communications, the trustworthiness of our foreign government interlocutors, and our own discussions with businessmen. On foreign government interlocutors, there is a real risk that governments will pass on information to managers of international reserves or SWFs who will trade on the information. On our own discussions with businessmen, there has always been a need for U.S. stability. While they may not call for U.S. leadership, they and others will appreciate predictable efforts on our part to manage the risks of the global economy and to ensure the benefi ts are broadly shared.
